




Based on obfuscation method:




Hardware obfuscation can be divided into two groups – Combinational and Sequential Obfuscation.

The one or more combinational obfuscation methods can be applied simultaneously on a circuit.

Single techniques can be either cyclic[6] or acyclic. The acyclic techniques applied for generating obfuscation were Random insertion, Secure Logic Locking[1], and Logic Cone Size based[2].

Multiple modifications can be coupling with SAT attack[3] resiliency block or using multiple obfuscation methods. The SAT resiliency block can be AntiSAT[4], SARLock[5], or any other technique. These blocks can be applied along with other combinational obfuscation blocks.

Based on physical characteristics of the obfuscated benchmark



Based on the size, the obfuscated circuits are categorized into three groups – with less than thousand gates, with more than a thousand but less than five thousand gates, and with more than five thousand gates. The size for benchmarks of acyclic and multiple methods are the size of corresponding synthesized benchmarks.

The combinational obfuscation has been done with 32 bit, 64 bit, 128 bit, and 256 bit keys.

Any benchmark that does not have key size as mentioned above is enlisted in the other key size group. In case of SAT resiliency technique, the AntiSAT methods are implemented with key size equal to the number of inputs and then 25% additional keys are added to obfuscate the AntiSAT block. The cyclic obfuscation benchmarks are also in this category.

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